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ABSTRACT
Despite the increasing attention on the role of internationalization in firms’ capital structure 
decisions, and the increasing adoption of zero leverage policies by multinationals, no study 
attempts to explain the effect of multi-nationality on the zero leverage decision. This study 
explores the relationship between the level of internationalization and zero leverage using a 
large panel of UK companies, while controlling for various company-related factors. We find 
strong evidence that multi-nationality affects the propensity of firms to have zero leverage and 
that this decision is affected by industry specificities.
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11. Introduction
A relatively new and puzzling empirical observation in corporate finance is that a 
growing number of firms adopt zero leverage policies in their capital structure (Bessler et al., 
2013). Recent studies build upon existing capital structure research (Frank and Goyal, 2003, 
2009; Myers, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988) in an attempt to 
explain this empirical irregularity. These studies analyse the zero leverage phenomenon by 
examining firm-level fundamentals (Devos et al., 2012), macro-economic variables (Dang, 
2013), corporate governance mechanisms and the level of managerial entrenchment (Byoun 
and Xu, 2013; Devos et al., 2012; Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), the intensity of human capital 
in industries (Lambrecht and Pawlina, 2013), and, finally, the long-run performance of zero 
leverage firms (Lee and Moon 2011). Devos et al. (2012) find that the zero leverage decision 
of US firms is not related to governance mechanisms or managerial entrenchment. Instead, they 
report that unlevered firms are small, young and financially constrained. This is corroborated 
in Dang (2013), who finds that UK firms tend to have zero leverage in their capital structure 
due to financial constraints and macro-economic conditions. Using international data, Bessler 
et al. (2013) find that IPO waves, industry effects, financial constraints, and risk are important 
determinants of zero leverage. While examining the benefits of debt, Korteweg (2010) 
documents that the market expects the zero levered firms to lever-up in the future to capture 
the benefits of debt financing.
However, these studies fail to account for the impact of the level of internationalisation 
on zero leverage policies. Accounting for the level of internationalisation is important for three 
main reasons. First, MNCs play a pivotal role in global economic activity. Second, prior 
research documents significant variations in the capital structure of domestic and multinational 
companies. These variations might be due to the fact that MNCs a) may be able to arbitrage 
segmented capital markets and diversify their income streams, thus reducing their risk (Errunza 
2and Senbet, 1981; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Lessard, 1973), and b) have more opportunities and 
are exposed to additional economic forces than domestic firms (Burgman, 1996). Based on the 
above, multinational firms might be in a position to take better advantage of debt financing.1 
Third, prior research has established significant links between the level of internationalization 
and various metrics of company performance (Aggarwal et al., 2011). It is therefore, plausible 
that the international dimension is also relevant in determining the zero leverage decision and, 
hence, models that ignore this factor could be misspecified.
Last but not least, one should not ignore the empirical observation that an increasing 
number of MNCs adopt zero leverage policies. This is evident in Figure 1, which highlights 
the evolution of the number of zero leverage firms and the foreign sales ratio of our sub-sample 
of UK MNCs from 1990 to 2014. Overall, there is evidence that the zero leverage phenomenon 
in multinationals is not negligible and requires further scrutiny.
[FIGURE 1]
We argue that extending the analysis to examine the impact of internationalisation on 
zero leverage is important to promote a better understanding of capital structure decisions. This 
study contributes to the literature by addressing two previously unexplored questions. First, 
does multi-nationality affect firms' zero leverage decisions? Second, do industry specificities 
exert an effect on the determinants of zero leverage? 
By way of preview, our results provide strong evidence that the propensity of a firm to 
have zero leverage is positively influenced by the level of internationalisation, while the 
coefficients on the variables used to control for other contributing factors – commonly 
identified in the capital structure literature – are largely in line with prior research. More 
1
 Indeed, some studies show that multinationals carry more debt (Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004) and 
have a lower cost of debt financing than domestic firms (Reeb et al., 2001). Other studies show that multinationals carry less 
debt in their capital structure relative to domestic firms (Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997). A common explanation for the 
lower debt financing in MNCs is that they have a greater cost of debt financing due to higher agency costs and their greater 
exposure to exchange risk and political risks (Chen et al., 1997).
3specifically, size, non-debt tax-shields, growth, cash equivalents and industry concentration 
reduce the propensity to have zero leverage, while tangibility, profitability and lower risk of 
bankruptcy increase it. Further analysis reveals that the effect of internationalisation on zero 
leverage varies across different industries. Specifically, the relationship between zero leverage 
and multi-nationality is positive and statistically significant for companies belonging to the oil 
and gas and telecommunications industries, irrespectively of how MNCs are defined.  When 
using the highest threshold for defining MNCs, the results are positive and statistically 
significant for companies belonging to the health care and consumer services industries.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section two describes the 
methodology and data employed in this study, Section three presents our findings, while 
Section four concludes. 
2. Methodology and data
2.1. Model Specification
The empirical investigation of capital structure has been achieved mostly through the use 
of fixed and random effect techniques, using linear models. These models explore the amount 
of debt raised by companies (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004; Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2009) but do not take into consideration the 
zero-leverage phenomenon. 
Our chosen sample includes both levered and zero-leverage companies. This means that 
the dependent variable takes non-negative values, while a substantial number of observations 
equals zero. Therefore, the present study uses the Logit model (Stock and Watson, 2007) as 
follows:
                                        Pr (Y = 1|X) = 1
1 + e - (α + βX)
 ,
 (1)
4where, is the binary dependent variable (leverage) which takes the value 1 for firm-year Y 
observations with zero leverage and 0 otherwise, is the constant,  is a vector of coefficients α β
to be estimated, and  is a vector of the firm specific and other explanatory variables affecting X
the zero leverage decision; the company degree of multi-nationality (foreign sales-to-total 
sales), size (log of total assets), asset structure (fixed assets-to-total assets), growth 
opportunities (market-to-book value), profitability (operating income plus depreciation-to-total 
assets), non-debt tax shields (depreciation-to-total assets), financial constraints (cash and cash 
equivalents-to-total assets), and industry concentration (HH index).2
2.2. Sample
We consider a large panel of UK firms from 1990 to 2014. We screen our sample of 
companies from Bloomberg using the following criteria. First, the company must be traded on 
the London Stock Exchange. Second, following previous capital structure research, we exclude 
utility and financial firms with Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes 7000 and 8000, 
respectively. These firms are subject to different regulations and have materially different 
capital structures (Dang, 2013). We also source company specific data from Bloomberg and 
apply the following standard data restrictions. First, we exclude firm-year observations for 
which the leverage and the foreign sales-to-total sales ratios are greater than one. Second, we 
winsorize all variables (except leverage) at the 1st and 99th percentile to alleviate any distorting 
effects of extreme values. The final sample with available observations for leverage and the 
foreign sales ratio, is an unbalanced panel comprising 2,527 firms and 19,953 firm-year 
2
 Details regarding the construction of our variables, motivation for their inclusion as well as hypotheses are 
offered in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
5observations. Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample by industry, multinational status3 
and zero leverage status.
[TABLE 1]
When all firms are considered, 12.85% of the firm-year observations have zero leverage. 
We further segregate the sample into domestic and multinational firms. The statistics reveal 
that 12.57% of firm-year observations for domestic firms have zero leverage, while the 
percentage of zero leverage firm-year observations for multinational firms stands at 12.85%. 
The presence of a non-negligible percentage of multinationals with zero debt policies is not 
consistent with the literature supporting that multinationals carry more debt (Mansi and Reeb, 
2002; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004), and have a lower cost of debt financing (Reeb et al., 
2001) than domestic firms, but is somewhat consistent with the literature supporting that 
multinationals carry less debt in their capital structure (Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997), 
relative to domestic firms. It is also inconsistent with recent evidence, showing that zero 
leverage policies are the result of financial constraints (Devos et al., 2012), if we adopt the 
wider view that multinationals are better positioned than domestic firms across many 
dimensions.
The statistics also reveal some degree of heterogeneity in the zero leverage policies of 
multinational firms across different industries. Specifically, the technology industry leads in 
terms of the percentage of zero leverage firm-year observations (27.39%), followed by oil and 
gas (22.71%) and health care (15.86%). Similar variations can be observed for domestic firms. 
The above observations are consistent with the view that extreme debt conservatism is industry-
specific (Dang, 2013).
3
 We follow the literature and define multinational firms as those with firm-year observations where the ratio of 
foreign sales-to-total sales is greater than 0.40. For robustness, we also use alternative thresholds for this ratio. 
For further details see footnote 5 on page 6.
62.3. Dependent and test variables
Following previous research (Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006) the 
study uses market leverage to represent the leverage of companies in the sample, as the 
significance of book ratios tends to be downplayed in the finance theory. This definition 
represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as:
 ,              (2)Li,t =
Di,t
Di,t + MCi,t
where,  is the market leverage,  is the sum of short-term and long-term debt, and  Li,t Di,t MCi,t
is the market capitalization of company i at fiscal year t. Zero leverage firms are defined as 
those with firm-year observations where   (Bessler et al., 2013).Li,t = 0
Prior research has shown that the level of leverage differs between domestic and 
multinational firms. Therefore, the present study argues that multi-nationality as a factor can 
influence firms to have zero leverage in their capital structure. The degree of multi-nationality 
is measured as follows:
 ,  (3)Mi,t =
FSi,t
TSi,t
where,  is the percentage of foreign sales to total sales,  is the figure of foreign sales Mi,t FSi,t
and  is the figure of total sales of company i at fiscal year t.4 MNCs are defined as those TSi,t
with firm-year observations where .5 Prior research (Burgman, 1996; Doukas and Mi,t > 0
Pantzalis, 2003; Lee and Kwok, 1988) argues that MNCs have lower level of leverage 
compared to domestic firms due to agency costs. Additionally, MNCs should avoid raising debt 
4
 We obtain these figures from the Worldscope database.
5
 The literature offers a wide range of definitions for MNCs, with a detailed summary of the various approaches 
offered in Aggarwal et al. (2011). It is not the purpose of this study to find the best method to define an MNC and, 
thus, elect to follow the leverage literature and use the ratio of foreign sales-to-total sales (see, Chen et al., 1997; 
Park et al., 2013) to obtain comparable results. The percentage threshold defining a MNC varies in these studies 
from , with results being largely consistent across definitions. We vary this threshold from 0 < Mi,t ≤ 1 0 < Mi,t
 and present results in Section 3.2. ≤ 1
7financing due to the increased probability of financial distress that might be attributed to 
changes in exchange rate (Burgman, 1996). Therefore, we hypothesize that multi-nationality 
increases the propensity to have zero leverage. 
2.4. Control variables
A combination of theory and empirical evidence motivates our selection of control 
variables. Size can be considered as a proxy for the information asymmetry within a company.  
The information provided to the managers and the outside investors of a company differs.  
According to Kadapakkam et al. (1998), investors are more interested in large companies and, 
thus, more willing to provide information to large companies than small companies.  In other 
words, ‘informational asymmetries between insiders in a firm and the capital markets are lower 
for large firms.  So, large firms should be more capable of issuing informationally sensitive 
securities like equity, and should have lower debt’ (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, p. 1457). 
On the other hand, the size of the company is associated with its potential bankruptcy 
costs, as larger companies have a lower probability of bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
Because the probability of bankruptcy is lower for larger companies, they are more able to 
access debt financing by borrowing at lower interest rates.  Therefore, according to the trade-
off theory, the size of a company is positively associated with leverage.  In the present article, 
the proxy used for the measurement of size is the logarithm of total assets (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Akhtar and Oliver, 2009).
Finally, the financial constraints hypothesis posits that financial constraints prevent firms 
from access to capital. In an imperfect market, where there are financial constraints, firms 
might not be able to undertake positive NPV projects, and due to their riskiness, they have to 
turn to equity financing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This implies that firms that are financially 
constrained will have lower level of leverage as part of their capital structure compared to 
companies that are not financially constrained (Dang, 2013). Previous research (Hadlock and 
8Pierce, 2010; Dang, 2013) has found that size can be used as a proxy for the measurement of 
financial constraints. As a result, small, financially constrained companies will be more likely 
to hold zero debt (Dang, 2013). The previous literature (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013) 
predicts that size decreases the propensity of a firm to have zero-leverage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that tangible assets have a higher liquidation value, 
which means that they can be used as a guarantee for debt in case of bankruptcy.  Companies 
with higher level of tangible assets face lower risk of bankruptcy, so they are able to borrow at 
lower risk premiums. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the shareholders of a highly 
leveraged company may attempt to “seize” capital from the bondholders of the company, which 
will increase the conflict between them. If the debt is secured, then the borrower is not able to 
use the funds for any reason other than a specified project, which will reduce the conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders (agency costs) and consequently the cost of debt. 
Therefore, according to the trade-off theory, it is expected that asset structure and leverage will 
be positively related.
According to the pecking order theory, gearing and asset structure are also positively 
related.  This proposition is based on the argument that companies with more tangible assets 
are more able to raise debt financing at a more attractive rate (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  In the 
present chapter the fixed tangible assets to total assets ratio is used as a measurement of asset 
structure (Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Bauer, 2004; Bevan and Danbolt, 2004; Akhtar and Oliver, 
2009; Teker et al., 2009). The previous literature (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013, Devos et 
al., 2012) predicts that asset structure decreases the propensity to have zero-leverage.
We use the market-to-book value ratio (market capitalization divided by the total book 
value) as a proxy for growth opportunities and to test the validity of the financial flexibility 
hypothesis (Dang, 2013). According to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), when 
companies turn to external financing, they prefer debt to equity; low-growth companies do not 
9have sufficient internal funds, and thus they turn to external financing. The previous literature 
(Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013) finds mixed results on the relationship between growth and 
the propensity of a firm to have zero-leverage.
According to the pecking order theory, there is a negative association between 
profitability and gearing, because companies with high profitability are able to raise capital 
through retained earnings, which in turn results in lower gearing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). On 
the other hand, according to Modigliani and Miller (1963), companies prefer debt to equity 
financing, for tax considerations. Companies with high profitability are more inclined to use 
debt financing because of agency and bankruptcy costs: the probability of being subject to 
bankruptcy is lower for companies with high profitability, because they can more easily pay 
back their debt obligations.  For this reason, and with regard to their need to maximize the tax 
shield, companies with high profitability will turn to more debt financing. The variable used in 
the present study for the measurement of profitability is the return on assets ratio defined as 
operating income plus depreciation-to-total assets (Erel et al., 2015). According to Bessler et 
al. (2013) profitability increases the propensity to have zero-leverage.
Debt and equity are treated differently: ‘since interest payments are tax deductible and 
dividends are not, the fiscal regime is generally considered to favour debt’, and therefore there 
may be a ‘positive tax incentive for corporate debt financing’ (Van der Wijst, 1990, p. 56).  
The absence of costs that may balance this tax incentive for corporate debt financing may lead 
to its maximal use.  According to Robichek and Myers (1965) and Baxter (1967), bankruptcy 
and reorganization are two costs that may balance the tax incentive for corporate financing.  
The higher the debt level, the higher the costs, which in turn increase the probability of 
bankruptcy.  A high probability of bankruptcy turns a company away from more debt financing, 
a process that eventually will balance the tax advantage.  Non-debt tax shields are expected to 
be negatively related to leverage, because they can reduce the tax benefits from interest 
10
payments.  Following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Ozkan (2001), the ratio of depreciation-
to-total assets is used as a proxy for the measurement of non-debt tax shields. The results on 
the relationship between non-debt tax-shields and the propensity to have zero leverage are 
mixed.
The company’s decision to maintain zero leverage is determined, and affected, by its 
desire to maintain financial flexibility (Dang, 2013).  We use cash holdings defined as the ratio 
of cash and cash equivalents-to-total assets6, which also tests the financial flexibility 
hypothesis. According to the financial flexibility hypothesis, firms tend to hold large cash 
reserves with a view to alleviate investment distortions in the future and to maintain their 
borrowing power (Dang, 2013; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
The level of cash holdings increases the propensity of a company to have zero-leverage 
(Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013).
This study takes into account industry concentration as explanatory variable that might 
have an effect on the zero-leverage firms. We use end of year balance sheet figures to construct 
the index. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is 
defined as:
(4)HH = ∑Ii = 1s2ijt
Where 
 
is the market share of firm i in industry j and year t. The index is calculated s i,t
for each industry and year and assigned to our firm-year observations. Small values of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index imply that many competing firms operate in the industry, while 
large values indicate that market share is concentrated in the hands of a few large firms. We 
anticipate that higher levels of concentration will raise the propensity of firms to choose zero 
6
 The previous literature uses cash holdings as a proxy for the measurement of future financial constraints (Erel 
et al., 2015). The difference between the financial constraints and the financial flexibility hypotheses is that, based 
on the financial constraint hypothesis, firms do not raise debt due to a lack of external financing, while under the 
financial flexibility hypothesis, firms do not raise debt due to strategic reasons (Dang, 2013). 
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leverage. In markets controlled by a few large corporations, their smaller peers will be facing 
more financial constraints, and hence will be more likely to be unable to issue debt.
3. Empirical findings
3.1. Univariate analysis
This section compares characteristics of zero leverage firms with those of levered firms 
across both the domestic and multinational dimension. Table 2 presents the mean values for 
our variables of interest and the t-statistics for differences in means among different samples.
[TABLE 2]
The first column presents the variables. Columns 2 and 3 present the mean values for 
levered domestic and multinational firms, while columns 4 and 5 contain the mean values for 
domestic and multinational zero leverage firms. Finally, columns 6 to 9 present the t-statistics 
for the differences in means across different groups of firms. The results provide some 
interesting insights as well as provide some support for our main hypothesis that multi-
nationality affects the zero leverage decision. First, consistent with Dang (2013), we find that 
zero leverage firms are significantly smaller than levered firms. Moreover, zero leverage 
multinational firms are significantly smaller than their zero leverage domestic counterparts. 
Second, the results reveal statistically significant differences in the cash holdings of levered 
and zero leverage firms, with the latter holding more cash. Interestingly, when we compare the 
zero leverage domestic with zero leverage multinationals, we find that the latter hold 
significantly less cash, are less liquid, and operate in more concentrated markets. These 
observations support the notion that multinationals that choose to hold no debt might be doing 
so as a result of greater financial constraints. Third, the zero leverage firms have significantly 
lower non-debt tax shields than levered firms. This is in contrast with the broader trade-off 
framework (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980), but in line with Dang (2013). Nevertheless, zero 
12
leverage multinationals exhibit significantly lower non-debt tax shields than domestic zero 
leverage companies. Consistent with the literature, zero leverage firms have higher z-scores 
and higher growth opportunities than levered firms, indicating a lower probability of 
bankruptcy. Finally, the results do not reveal any significant difference in the mean z-score and 
growth opportunities of domestic and multinational zero leverage firms.
3.2. Multivariate analysis
This section examines the results from the logistic regression analysis of a firms’ decision 
to have zero leverage. We examine whether multi-nationality influences the propensity of a 
firm to have zero leverage, while controlling for a number of factors commonly applied in the 
capital structure literature. Table 3 presents our findings for the full sample. Models 1 to 5 
present alternative definitions of multi-nationality, based on different thresholds of its proxy 
variable.
[TABLE 3]
Model 1 presents the coefficient estimates when our proxy for multi-nationality (foreign 
sales-to-total sales) is greater than 0. Although we fail to uncover any significant relationship 
between multi-nationality and zero leverage status, other definitions of multi-nationality (see 
models 3 to 6), yield significant coefficients. Specifically, we find a positive relationship 
between multi-nationality and zero leverage status, which increases in magnitude and 
significance with increases in our chosen threshold. This implies that multinational firms are 
more likely to adopt zero leverage policies. This result is consistent with our primary 
hypothesis that multi-nationality increases the propensity to have zero leverage due to agency 
costs and the increased probability of financial distress due to foreign exchange fluctuations.
Moreover, the coefficients on the remaining variables are consistent across models and 
also largely in line with prior work on zero leverage (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 2013; Devos 
et al., 2012). Starting with size, its coefficient is negative and significant. This is consistent 
13
with the financial constraint hypothesis, which predicts that smaller firms are likely to be more 
financially constrained and, thus, less able to raise debt. The coefficient on the cash ratio is 
positive and significant, indicating that firms with larger cash reserves are more likely to adopt 
zero leverage policies. This finding is in line with the financial flexibility hypothesis that firms 
tend to hold large cash reserves with a view to alleviate investment distortions in the future and 
to maintain their borrowing power (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Modigliani and Miller, 
1963). Growth opportunities enter our model with a negative coefficient, suggesting that high-
growth firms have a lower propensity to have zero leverage. This result corroborates the 
findings in Bessler et al. (2013), but contradicts Dang (2013). We also find that tangibility 
(asset structure), increases the propensity of firms to have zero leverage. To the extent that this 
is a suitable proxy for tangibility, our results are not in line with either the trade-off, or pecking 
order theory. The coefficient on profitability is positive and significant and indicates that more 
profitable firms are more likely to hold zero debt. This is consistent with the results of Bessler 
et al. (2013) and in line with the pecking order, according to which, more profitable firms are 
more likely to rely on internal funds and, therefore, less likely to issue debt. Finally, consistent 
with Dang (2013), we find that companies with lower probabilities of bankruptcy are less likely 
to issue debt. We also report a negative relationship between the level of industry concentration 
and the propensity to have zero leverage. This finding suggests that firms operating in more 
competitive industries are more likely to have debt in their capital structure.
We also perform additional tests in order to shed more light into our univariate finding 
that the characteristics of firms vary across industries. Prior studies employ intercept dummies 
to control for the overall effect of industry on zero leverage decisions, albeit without examining 
the potential effect on its determinants. Table 4 presents industry specific results on the 
marginal effects from logistic regressions of firms’ zero leverage decisions. Specifically, Panel 
A presents the results for the oil and gas, basic materials and industrials industries, Panel B 
14
presents the results for the consumer goods, healthcare and consumer services industries, while 
Panel C presents the results for the telecommunications and technology industries.
[TABLE 4]
Overall, the results are supportive of our univariate findings and point to the fact that 
industry specificities exert an effect on the determinants of zero leverage. A closer examination 
of our test variable reveals some interesting variations across industries. Our full sample results 
on the positive and significant relationship between multi-nationality and the propensity of 
firms to have zero leverage persist for the oil and gas, telecommunications, health care, and 
technology firms. Nevertheless, the latter two industries realise such coefficient only when the 
highest threshold for defining a multi-national firm  is considered. Nevertheless, (Mi,t > 0.8)
we do not find a significant relationship between any proxy for multi-nationality and zero 
leverage decisions for the basic materials, consumer goods and consumer services industries.
We also examine whether the relationship between our control variables varies with the 
type of industry. First, the results for the oil and gas, industrials and technology industries 
remain consistent for all control variables except asset structure and profitability. It seems that 
tangibility and profitability are not associated with a higher or lower propensity of those firms 
to have zero leverage. Second, the results for the basic materials show that profitability, non-
debt tax shields and growth do not affect the propensity to have zero leverage, while the results 
for the remaining control variables are in line with the results of our full sample. Third, industry 
concentration is the only control variable that does not relate with the propensity to have zero 
leverage in the consumer goods industry. Fourth, the results on the health care industry reveal 
some interesting variations from our overall findings. The results remain consistent only for 
the coefficients on size, cash ratio, non-debt tax shields and growth. Tangibility and 
profitability assume negative signs and, thus, found to significantly decrease the propensity to 
have zero leverage. While this is not in line with our overall sample results, it is consistent with 
15
Dang (2013). In addition, z-score and industry concentration do not have an impact on the 
decision to have zero leverage. Fifth, the results on the consumer services industry are 
consistent only for the coefficients on size, cash ratio, growth and z-score. Sixth, size, 
profitability and z-score remain consistent as important determinants of the zero leverage 
decision of the telecommunications industry. While tangibility is also significant, there is a 
change in its sign, which turns negative. Finally, the results on the industry concentration 
remain consistent only for the technology sector. Industry concentration is found to be 
positively related to the propensity to have zero leverage for the oil and gas, basic materials, 
industrials, consumer services and telecommunications industries, while it is insignificant for 
consumer goods and health care industries.
4. Concluding remarks
Despite the benefits of debt, a persistent and puzzling empirical regularity is the fact that 
many firms adopt zero leverage policies. At the same time, companies are increasing their 
international presence at a torrid pace, while a non-negligible number of them are adopting 
zero leverage policies. Despite the increasing attention on the role of internationalization in 
firms’ capital structure decisions, and the increasing adoption of zero leverage policies by 
MNCs, no study attempts to explain the effect of multi-nationality on the zero leverage 
phenomenon.
Our study contributes to this front by examining whether multi-nationality plays an 
important role in the zero leverage decision. We find that multi-nationality increases the 
propensity of firms to adopt zero leverage policies. More specifically, our results indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between zero leverage and multi-nationality, which increases in 
magnitude and significance with increases in the chosen threshold used for the classification 
of multi-nationality. Moreover, consistent with existing studies, the results indicate that firms' 
decision to remain debt-free can be explained through the presence of financial constraints and 
16
by their desire to maintain financial flexibility. Further tests reveal that industry specificities 
exert an effect on the determinants of zero leverage. Further research is deemed necessary so 
as to shed more light into the underlying industry dynamics affecting the zero leverage decision 
and its drivers for both multinational and domestic firms.
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Table 1.
Number of firm-year observations for domestic and MNC firms by leverage status 
ICB Code Industry Name Domestic Firms MNCs
All Levered % Zero Leverage % All Levered % Zero Leverage %
All 12362 10808 87.42% 1554 12.57% 7592 6582 83.72% 1010 12.85%
0001 Oil and Gas 289 229 79.24% 60 20.76% 621 480 77.29% 141 22.71%
1000 Basic Materials 349 309 88.54% 40 11.46% 866 755 87.18% 111 12.82%
2000 Industrials 4187 3817 91.16% 370 8.84% 2593 2446 94.33% 147 5.67%
3000 Consumer Goods 1906 1708 89.61% 198 10.39% 786 700 89.06% 86 10.94%
4000 Health Care 694 544 78.39% 150 21.61% 618 520 84.14% 98 15.86%
5000 Consumer Services 3382 3015 89.15% 367 10.85% 895 791 88.38% 104 11.62%
6000 Telecommunications 171 154 90.06% 17 9.94% 96 79 82.29% 17 17.71%
9000 Technology 1384 1032 74.57% 352 25.43% 1117 811 72.61% 306 27.39%
26
Figure 1. The evolution of foreign sales and zero leverage in multinationals.
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Table 2
Characteristics of levered and zero leverage firms by MNC status.
Levered Zero Leverage Δ Mean (t-stat)
1. Domestic 2. MNCs 3. Domestic 4. MNCs 1-2 1-3 2-4 3-4
Cash ratio 0.096 0.116 0.296 0.280 -(9.76)a -(48.50)a -(34.73)a (1.75)c
Altman z-Score 3.264 3.252 8.638 10.047 (0.13) -(25.60)a -(24.33)a (2.14)b
Asset Structure 0.494 0.511 0.352 0.442 (4.69)a (21.23)a (9.15)a -(8.90)a
Foreign sales ratio 0.094 0.708 0.065 0.810 - - -(15.85)a -
Size 4.174 5.200 2.854 3.186 -(32.93)a (26.80)a (28.10)a -(8.90)a
Growth opportunities 2.877 2.823 3.625 3.390 -(0.55) -(3.99)a -(2.81)b -(0.93)
Non-debt tax shields 0.037 0.036 0.028 0.023 -(3.55)a (11.20)a (12.38)a (4.30)a
Profitability (ROA) 0.074 0.077 -0.015 -0.059 -(0.81) (14.08)a (16.61)a -(2.98)b
Industry Concentration (HH) 0.079 0.115 0.104 0.160 -(20.83)a -(9.20)a -(10.26)a -(10.75)a
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Table 3
Logistic regressions of firms’ zero leverage decision.
This table presents the marginal effects from logistic regressions of firms’ zero leverage decisions. Zero 
leverage firms are defined as those with firm-year observations where market leverage is equal to zero. The 
first column presents the independent variables, while each of the subsequent columns presents the results for 
different definitions of multi-nationality. MNC is a dummy variable equal to one when the foreign sales-to-
total sales ratio exceeds the predefined threshold and zero otherwise. The thresholds are 0 in Model 1, 0.20 in 
Model 2, 0.40 in Model 3, 0.60 in Model 4, and 0.80 in Model 5. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Cash ratio 
is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio of fixed assets-to-total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of operating income and depreciation-to-total assets. Non-debt tax shields is the ratio 
of depreciation-to-total assets. Growth is the market-to-book value. Z-score is measured using Altman’s 
specification. HH is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index capturing the level of industry concentration. The industry 
dummies are set to one for each industry and zero otherwise. Figures in brackets show z-statistics (Huber-White 
robust standard errors and covariances). a/b/c denote significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 levels, respectively.
Degree of multi-nationality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
MNC 0 MNC 20 MNC 40 MNC 60 MNC 80
Constant 0.010 -0.052 -0.115 -0.135 -0.184
(0.030) -(0.157) -(0.352) -(0.414) -(0.562)
MNC -0.102 -0.032 0.104 0.261 0.547
-(1.532) -(0.515) (1.660)c (3.850)a (6.902)a
Size -0.380 -0.384 -0.391 -0.395 -0.394
-(22.420)a -(22.847)a -(23.409)a -(23.871)a -(24.069)a
Cash ratio 4.325 4.324 4.303 4.263 4.207
(19.971)a (19.966)a (19.925)a (19.782)a (19.593)a
Asset Structure 0.402 0.408 0.403 0.372 0.296
(2.731)a (2.769)a (2.732)a (2.527)b (2.003)b
Profitability 0.367 0.368 0.376 0.393 0.420
(2.340)b (2.354)b (2.417)b (2.544)b (2.728)a
Non-debt tax shields -11.478 -11.463 -11.326 -11.084 -10.726
-(9.178)a -(9.154)a -(9.053)a -(8.891)a -(8.678)a
Growth -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024
-(4.397)a -(4.443)a -(4.432)a -(4.419)a -(4.347)a
z-score 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.045
(7.636)a (7.656)a (7.665)a (7.653)a (7.587)a
HH -1.321 -1.292 -1.310 -1.405 -1.512
-(1.928)c -(1.886)c -(1.913)c -(2.044)b -(2.183)b
Industry Dummies
Basic Materials -0.839 -0.829 -0.832 -0.842 -0.844
-(3.408)a -(3.376)a -(3.396)a -(3.439)a -(3.467)a
Industrials -1.484 -1.466 -1.429 -1.405 -1.337
-(5.144)a -(5.080)a -(4.956)a -(4.855)a -(4.600)a
Consumer Goods -1.037 -1.014 -0.964 -0.933 -0.872
-(4.139)a -(4.046)a -(3.850)a -(3.720)a -(3.460)a
Health Care -0.919 -0.907 -0.875 -0.836 -0.755
-(5.491)a -(5.425)a -(5.235)a -(4.997)a -(4.491)a
Consumer Services -1.069 -1.042 -0.984 -0.944 -0.866
-(3.818)a -(3.718)a -(3.515)a -(3.360)a -(3.072)a
Telecommunications -0.222 -0.212 -0.165 -0.102 0.007
-(0.708) -(0.671) -(0.520) -(0.322) (0.021)
Technology -0.597 -0.589 -0.565 -0.539 -0.462
-(2.552)b -(2.515)b -(2.411)b -(2.291)b -(1.946)c
N 16,360 16,360 16,360 16,360 16,360
McFadden R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
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Table 4
Logistic regressions of firms’ zero leverage decision by industry.
This table presents industry specific results on the marginal effects from logistic regressions of firms’ zero leverage decisions. Zero leverage firms are defined as those with firm-year 
observations where market leverage is equal to zero. The first column presents the independent variables, while each of the subsequent columns presents the results for different definitions of 
multi-nationality, and industry. Panel A presents the results for the oil and gas, basic materials and industrials industries. Panel B presents the results for the consumer goods, healthcare and 
consumer services industries, while Panel C presents the results for the telecommunications and technology industries. MNC 40, MNC 60 and MNC 80 are dummy variables equal to one when 
the foreign sales-to-total sales ratio exceeds 0.40, 0.60 and 0.80, respectively, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents-to-
total assets. Asset structure is the ratio of fixed assets-to-total assets. Profitability is the ratio of operating income and depreciation-to-total assets. Non-debt tax shields is the ratio of depreciation-
to-total assets. Growth is the market-to-book value. Z-score is measured using Altman’s specification. HH is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index capturing the level of industry concentration. Figures 
in brackets show z-statistics (Huber-White robust standard errors and covariances). a/b/c denote significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel A Oil & Gas Basic Materials Industrials
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -4.788 -4.571 -4.339 -3.590 -3.491 -3.264 -2.817 -2.793 -2.680
-(3.534)a -(3.349)a -(3.252)a -(3.792)a -(3.777)a -(3.352)a -(7.150)a -(7.098)a -(6.760)a
MNC 40 0.512 - - 0.202 - - -0.253 - -
(1.709)c - - (0.629) - - -(1.896)c - -
MNC 60 - 0.638 - - 0.242 - - -0.143 -
- (2.340)b - - (0.845) - - -(0.914) -
MNC 80 - - 0.572 - - 0.462 - - 0.307
- - (2.333)b - - (1.395) - - (1.551)
Size -0.367 -0.364 -0.346 -0.442 -0.440 -0.440 -0.496 -0.506 -0.521
-(5.274)a -(5.213)a -(4.846)a -(5.343)a -(5.376)a -(5.333)a -(13.499)a -(13.671)a -(14.231)a
Cash ratio 3.672 3.520 3.378 3.683 3.540 3.141 4.666 4.655 4.540
(3.719)a (3.558)a (3.377)a (2.785)a (2.647)a (2.250)b (10.337)a (10.318)a (10.160)a
Asset Structure 0.716 0.567 0.437 2.409 2.301 2.012 -0.372 -0.381 -0.467
(1.096) (0.866) (0.666) (3.020)a (2.858)a (2.326)b -(1.079) -(1.103) -(1.328)
Profitability -0.552 -0.526 -0.561 -1.196 -1.190 -1.134 -0.269 -0.248 -0.182
-(0.930) -(0.884) -(0.957) -(1.507) -(1.517) -(1.466) -(0.564) -(0.521) -(0.386)
Non-debt tax shields -8.209 -7.809 -7.819 -0.811 -0.876 -0.985 -9.588 -9.534 -9.464
-(1.871)c -(1.778)c -(1.795)c -(0.132) -(0.144) -(0.163) -(3.680)a -(3.638)a -(3.574)a
Growth -0.134 -0.132 -0.128 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.039 -0.041 -0.041
-(2.032)b -(1.989)b -(1.979)b -(0.539) -(0.547) -(0.536) -(2.166)b -(2.242)b -(2.214)b
z-score 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.140 0.140 0.139 0.091 0.090 0.089
(3.546)a (3.495)a (3.545)a (3.132)a (3.154)a (3.192)a (4.806)a (4.796)a (4.700)a
HH 8.634 8.215 7.960 4.209 4.086 3.601 80.814 79.361 76.000
(3.426)a (3.226)a (3.143)a (2.142)b (2.060)b (1.688)c (5.466)a (5.370)a (5.116)a
N 723 723 723 984 984 984 5,834 5,834 5,834
McFadden R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.24
30
Panel B Consumer Goods Health Care Consumer Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -2.156 -2.159 -2.141 1.287 1.280 1.317 -3.905 -3.912 -3.898
-(3.054)a -(3.061)a -(3.033)a (1.812)c (1.800)c (1.838)c -(9.385)a -(9.423)a -(9.469)a
MNC 40 0.008 - - 0.030 - - -0.239 - -
(0.038) - - (0.146) - - -(1.438) - -
MNC 60 - -0.055 - - 0.313 - - -0.240 -
- -(0.229) - - (1.485) - - -(1.136) -
MNC 80 - - -0.163 - - 0.563 - - -0.250
- - -(0.504) - - (2.544)b - - -(0.855)
Size -0.634 -0.634 -0.637 -0.243 -0.260 -0.276 -0.294 -0.296 -0.300
-(11.162)a -(11.407)a -(11.491)a -(3.751)a -(4.027)a -(4.240)a -(8.857)a -(8.920)a -(9.065)a
Cash ratio 7.327 7.359 7.392 1.397 1.366 1.389 5.202 5.197 5.211
(8.691)a (8.688)a (8.667)a (2.791)a (2.727)a (2.759)a (9.507)a (9.521)a (9.569)a
Asset Structure 1.951 1.983 2.046 -1.466 -1.465 -1.424 -0.617 -0.594 -0.570
(4.088)a (4.113)a (4.128)a -(3.205)a -(3.161)a -(3.055)a -(1.792)c -(1.727)c -(1.667)c
Profitability 3.357 3.341 3.336 -1.222 -1.250 -1.219 0.693 0.676 0.682
(2.839)a (2.822)a (2.841)a -(3.061)a -(3.134)a -(3.126)a (1.245) (1.221) (1.239)
Non-debt tax shields -13.408 -13.479 -13.966 -35.949 -35.925 -35.625 1.383 1.534 1.559
-(3.152)a -(3.154)a -(3.190)a -(5.199)a -(5.205)a -(5.156)a (0.674) (0.752) (0.770)
Growth -0.077 -0.077 -0.078 -0.048 -0.048 -0.045 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
-(2.266)b -(2.270)b -(2.275)b -(3.624)a -(3.649)a -(3.480)a -(1.758)c -(1.722)c -(1.698)c
z-score 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.081 0.081 0.081
(3.616)a (3.613)a (3.614)a (0.936) (1.056) (1.002) (1.958)c (1.957)c (1.958)c
HH 6.130 6.145 6.031 -2.351 -2.454 -2.601 57.219 56.626 55.792
(0.940) (0.944) (0.926) -(1.410) -(1.461) -(1.529) (6.979)a (6.914)a (6.959)a
N 2,377 2,377 2,377 994 994 994 3,450 3,450 3,450
McFadden R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27
Panel C Telecommunications Technology
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant -4.792 -5.229 -1.714 -0.136 -0.117 -0.180
-(1.598) -(1.666)c -(0.663) -(0.428) -(0.376) -(0.579)
MNC 40 4.884 - - 0.121 - -
(4.601)a - - (0.929) - -
MNC 60 - 5.054 - - 0.153 -
- (3.918)a - - (1.078) -
MNC 80 - - 3.648 - - 0.437
- - (4.453)a - - (2.652)a
Size -0.357 -0.256 -0.280 -0.207 -0.209 -0.213
-(3.023)a -(2.456)b -(1.707)c -(5.208)a -(5.167)a -(5.502)a
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Cash ratio 3.780 4.661 2.985 2.925 2.920 2.935
(1.228) (1.328) (1.226) (6.807)a (6.809)a (6.894)a
Asset Structure -7.187 -6.892 -4.513 0.036 0.031 0.061
-(4.032)a -(3.475)a -(2.292)b (0.101) (0.088) (0.172)
Profitability 7.486 5.351 3.649 0.288 0.302 0.342
(2.587)a (2.608)a (1.869)c (1.161) (1.214) (1.390)
Non-debt tax shields -3.380 -9.702 -7.400 -14.396 -14.260 -13.885
-(0.234) -(0.791) -(0.750) -(4.408)a -(4.358)a -(4.272)a
Growth -0.020 0.005 -0.024 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
-(0.440) (0.119) -(0.802) -(2.087)b -(2.103)b -(2.033)b
z-score 0.197 0.183 0.138 0.047 0.047 0.046
(2.628)a (2.478)b (2.108)b (3.909)a (3.914)a (3.843)a
HH 10.169 11.156 4.003 -7.508 -7.526 -7.250
(1.691)c (1.754)c (0.760) -(4.962)a -(4.977)a -(4.847)a
N 200 200 200 1,798 1,798 1,798
McFadden R2 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.17 0.17 0.17
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Table 5
Definition of the variables.
Variable Definition
Zero-
leverage
 A dummy variable taking the value 1 if market leverage (calculated as the sum of short 
term debt (BS047) and long term debt (BS051) over short term debt (BS047) and long 
term debt (BS051) plus market capitalisation (RR902)) equals zero (0) and 0 otherwise.
MNC A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (08731) 
is above 0, and 0 otherwise. This figure is extracted from Worldscope.
Size The logarithm of total assets (BS035)
Cash ratio The ratio of cash and cash equivalents (BS010)-to-total assets (BS035)
Asset 
Structure
The ratio of fixed tangible assets (RR879) to total assets (BS035)
Profitability The return on assets ratio defined as operating income (IS033) plus depreciation (IS070) 
-to-total assets (BS035)
Non-debt tax 
shields
The ratio of depreciation (IS070)-to-total assets (BS035)
Growth The market-to-book value ratio (F0940) calculated as market capitalization divided by 
the total book value 
Altman’s (1968) z-score: 
Z =  1.2X1 +  1.4X2 +  3.3X3 +  0.6X4 +  X5
z-score
where X1 is the ratio of working capital (RR150) to tangible assets (RR879), X2 is the 
ratio of retained earnings (BS065) to tangible assets (RR879), X3 is the earnings before 
interest and tax (RR803) to tangible assets (RR879), X4 is the market value of equity 
(RR250) to total liabilities (RR005), and X5 is the sales (RR800) to tangible assets 
(RR879) ratio.
HH The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a measure of industry concentration calculated as 
follows:
HH =
I
∑
i = 1
s2ijt
Where  is the market share of firm  in industry  and year . The index is calculated s i,t i j t
for each industry and year and assigned to our firm-year observations. Small values of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index imply that many competing firms operate in the 
industry, while large values indicate that market share is concentrated in the hands of a 
few large firms
